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Abstract 
This paper examines the incentive effects caused by the interactions between 
unemployment insurance (UI) and sickness insurance (SI), two important components 
of Sweden’s social insurance system. There are two main topics of interest: how the 
sickness report rate and the length of the subsequent sick period among the 
unemployed are affected by (i) the limit of 300 workdays for UI benefits, and (ii) the 
difference in maximum compensation between UI and SI benefits. Results obtained by 
duration analysis suggest that sick reports increase as the UI benefit expiration date 
approaches. There is also evidence of an incentive effect on the sick-report rate because 
SI offers greater compensation than UI. But neither of these factors seems to have a 
significant effect on the length of the sick period. 
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1 Introduction 
The sickness insurance (SI) expenses have increased drastically in Sweden in 
the late 1990s, caused by more as well as longer absence periods due to 
sickness. Consequently, the public debate has been heated about reasons for the 
absence and measures for preventing the rising figures. The debate’s focus has 
all but exclusively been on the employed, presumably because most of the 
expenses are caused by an employee’s absence from work. Economic research 
on absence from work due to sickness in Sweden points to the same findings. 
Examples of studies conducted on employee absenteeism include: Broström et 
al. (1998); Cassel et al. (1996); Edgerton and Wells (2000); Henrekson and 
Persson (2001); and Johansson and Palme (1996 and 2000). Currie and 
Madrian (1999) summarise international research on the subject.  
But the recent rise in absence from work is far from the only question of 
interest in this context. Besides employed workers, unemployed people who 
report in sick are also able to receive SI benefits. According to government 
estimates for 1999, unemployed people, including students, reported about 
20  % of the total sick days. Interactions between the SI system and other 
components of the social insurance system are very important when examining 
the behaviour of this group.  
This paper examines sick periods among the unemployed, and particularly 
incentive effects caused by interactions between the unemployment insurance 
(UI) and SI systems.  The interplay between various social insurance programs 
is a largely unexplored research area inside and outside Sweden. For example, 
Krueger and Meyer (2001) point out that the overlap among insurance 
programs is a fruitful area for future research in the US and Europe. 
Institutional settings, specific for every country, define which questions are 
interesting to examine. In Sweden, for example, the designs of UI and SI imply 
two potential incentive effects. First, UI and SI benefits are based on the 
employee’s wages before unemployment, up to a ceiling above which the 
benefit is constant. For most of the 1990s, the replacement ratio has been the 
same in both systems, whereas the ceiling for SI benefits has been about 35-
40 % higher than for UI benefits. Thus an unemployed individual, who earned 
a high wage while employed, receives greater benefits from SI than UI and can 
thus benefit from reporting sick. To determine whether or not the unemployed 
exploit this possibility, this paper examines the evolution of sick-report rates IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  3
and the length of subsequent sick periods for high-wage earners and low-wage 
earners, who are unemployed. 
Second, for the majority of the unemployed, the UI benefit period is limited 
to 300 workdays. After that, the benefit expires. While receiving SI benefits, 
unemployed people reserve their UI benefits, thus postponing the expiration 
date. Previous studies on UI benefits in Sweden indicate that as the end of the 
300 workday limit approaches, the transition rate from unemployment to 
employment increases (see Carling et  al, 1996). In this study I examine 
whether the UI time limit – combined with the ability to report sick to lengthen 
the maximum compensation period – has an effect on reported sicknesses 
among the unemployed.  
The remainder of this paper is organised like this: section 2 presents the 
central features of Sweden’s UI and SI systems; section 3 discusses theoretical 
issues; section 4 presents the data; section 5 shows the empirical strategy and 
results; and section 6 contains concluding remarks. 
 
 
2  UI and SI benefits in Sweden 
The benefits for UI and SI systems are income related. UI consists of two parts: 
a fixed basic amount of compensation and an income-related amount that is 
determined by previous earnings. To qualify for the income-related benefit, a 
person must comply with the membership condition and the work condition. To 
fulfil the membership condition, the person must have been a member of an UI 
fund for at least a year before unemployment, whereas the work condition 
defines the minimum number of days the person must have worked before 
unemployment.
1 If unemployed persons comply with just one of these 
conditions, they only receive the basic amount, which during the 1998-1999 
study period was SEK 240 per working day (SEK 5,280 per month). Both the 
replacement ratio and the ceiling of the income-related UI benefits have 
changed several times during the 1990s, but during the 1998-1999 study 
period, the compensation was 80 % of previous earnings up to a ceiling of 
80 % of SEK 15,950 per month.  
                                                      
1 The work condition requires that before unemployment, the person has worked at least 70 hours 
per month, for six months, within a 12-month period. Or the person could qualify for the 
condition by working at least 450 hours during a continuous six-month period.  IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  4
The SI system provides income-related compensation in case of sickness. 
For employed workers, the employer is responsible for the compensation of the 
first 14 days of sickness (28 days until 31 March 1998); after that, regional 
social insurance offices take over. Unemployed people are also eligible for SI 
as long as they are registered at local employment offices as job seekers and if 
they were previously employed.
2 For the unemployed, the regional social 
insurance offices pay out the SI benefits from the beginning. For both the 
employed and unemployed, the first sick day is not compensated.
3 To receive 
additional compensation, the insured person must show a doctor’s certificate 
after seven days and then again after four weeks. Given that the person does 
this, there is no formal time limit for the compensation.  
For most of the 1990s, the replacement ratio of SI has been the same as in 
the UI system, whereas the ceiling has consistently been much higher: in 1998, 
it was 80  % of SEK  22,750  per month, and in 1999, it was 80  % of 
SEK 23,250 per month.
4 Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the two benefits. 
Unequal ceilings imply that an unemployed person, with a previous monthly 
wage above SEK 15,950, benefits from reporting sick. So the higher the wages 
while employed, the greater the difference between UI and SI benefits while 
unemployed.
5 How much the unemployed gains by reporting sick also depends 
on the length of the subsequent sick period due to the uncompensated first sick 
day. But for simplicity, Figure 1 does not account for the uncompensated day. 
 
                                                      
2  Compared to the work condition of UI, the rules according to compensation from SI are not as 
strict, because it is required that employment before the unemployment period was intended to 
continue. In principle, even employment for one month might qualify the unemployed person for 
SI benefits, even though the regional social insurance offices are recommended to claim regular 
earnings for at least one year before unemployment (Telephone conversation with Ann-Sofie 
Åkerman, social insurance office Uppsala, 16 February 2001). 
3 If the previous SI period ended less than a week before, or if the person has a chronic illness 
and is subsequently covered by a special condition, he or she receives SI compensation on the 
first sick day. 
4 Formally, the maximum level of SI is defined by the base amount, a measure generally used as 
an index for social insurance. The income ceiling for SI is 7.5 times the base amount, which was 
SEK 36,400 in 1998 and SEK 37,200 in 1999.  
5 Many workers are provided with (often by their employer) various private agreements that 
increase their actual UI or SI compensation. But it is impossible to obtain information about 
these agreements, and thus their existence is ignored in this study. IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  5













Note: SEK 100 equals to about € 10.9 (February 2002). The limit for maximum SI benefits was 
SEK 22,750 in 1998 and SEK 23,250 in 1999. 
 
Moreover, the UI benefits are time-limited. After qualifying for UI, an 
unemployed person up to age 56 is guaranteed to receive benefits for a 
maximum of 60 weeks (300 workdays), either continuously or with breaks in 
the unemployment period. Unemployed people, age 57 and older (age 55 and 
older until 31 December 1997), receive benefits for 450 workdays.
6 In other 
words, in the beginning of the very first unemployment period, the person has 
300 (450) benefit days to receive.  
But very few are continuously unemployed that long; unemployment is 
often interrupted by for example periods of work and studies. In the beginning 
of a second (or subsequent) unemployment period, the number of benefit days 
depends on how long the break has been, and whether the person has worked 
during the break. If the break does not exceed a year, and the person has not 
worked enough to fulfil the work condition again, then he or she is entitled to 
what is left of the 300 (450) days after the first unemployment period. If the 
person has fulfilled the work condition during the break, the number of benefit 
days is again 300 (450). Finally, if the break exceeds a year, and the person has 
not fulfilled the work condition, he or she is no longer entitled to UI benefits.
7 
  
                                                      
6 The UI system was reformed again in February 2001, and today nobody is entitled to 450 days. 
7 It is allowed to have a longer break than one year if the person has, for example, been on 
maternity leave or studied full-time.   
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Until February 2001, it was possible to use active labour market 
programmes as a measure to qualify the unemployed for new benefit periods. 
Programmes that lasted for at least six months were enough to comply with the 
working condition, and according to results in Sianesi (2001), this praxis was 
actually used at local unemployment offices. Nevertheless, the time limit may 
have an effect on the behaviour of unemployed people. 
  
 
3 Theoretical  issues 
In the economic literature, absence from work has been traditionally analysed 
within the framework of a labour supply model. Absence from work emerges 
in a situation where the employment contract obliges the worker to supply a 
certain amount of labour that exceeds the worker’s optimal labour supply, 
determined by utility maximisation over income and leisure, subject to income 
and  time constraints. Absence is associated with a cost in terms of lost income. 
Examples of such models and empirical applications are provided by Allen 
(1981), Barmby, Orme and Treble (1991), Barmby, Sessions and Treble (1994) 
and Brown and Sessions (1996). 
In the labour supply framework, the worker’s health is assumed to affect his 
or her marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure: the more sick 
the worker, the higher the value of leisure relative to income. Barmby et al 
(1994) incorporate health explicitly in their theoretical model by including an 
index of sickness in the utility function of the worker: higher values of the 
index imply higher level of sickness. The index, denoted by σ, is assumed to be 
a random variable. In other words, the worker is exposed to health shocks that 
entail a new level of sickness, and thus a new utility maximisation problem. 
Given certain (realistic) assumptions on the form of the utility function, a 
solution to the utility maximisation problem implies a unique value of sickness, 
σ*, for which the worker is indifferent between work attendance and absence, 
given the costs and benefits associated with the two states. For levels of 
sickness above this reservation level of sickness the worker optimises his or her 
utility by staying at home.  
Generally, such a framework should be applicable even to the unemployed: 
a transition to SI benefits is associated with more leisure than collecting UI 
benefits, since the unemployed worker is obliged to put effort on job search 
while on UI but not on SI benefits. If so, then a reservation level of sickness IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  7
can be derived for the unemployed worker determining the value of sickness 
for which he or she is indifferent between UI and SI benefits. 
The effect of different benefit ceilings on the unemployed worker’s 
tendency to switch to and stay on SI benefits can then be analysed in terms of 
the  reservations level of sickness. In the Barmby et  al (1994) model, it is 
straightforward to show that an increase in the sick pay lowers the reservation 
level of sickness leading to more absence from work. A higher sick pay implies 
a lower cost associated with absence and alters thus the worker’s budget 
constraint. Given that leisure is a normal good, this leads to a decrease in the 
optimal labour supply of the worker. Similarly, an increase in SI benefits 
relative to UI benefits lowers the unemployed worker’s supply of job search, 
implying higher probability to switch to and stay on SI benefits. 
The effect of time-limited UI benefits can be considered by combining the 
model of Barmby et al (1994) with the standard job search model by Mortensen 
(1977).
8 One of the most important implications derived from the Mortensen 
model is that the unemployed worker’s reservation wage declines as the worker 
approaches the date of benefit expiration, implying a rise in the exit rate to 
employment. This is due to a change in the relative value of unemployment: 
The value decreases as the elapsed duration of the benefit period increases, 
whereas the value of employment remains the same.
9  
So a general implication is that the closer the unemployed worker is to UI 
benefit expiration, the more attractive all other states in relation to 
unemployment become. Consequently, when the unemployed worker is 
exposed to health shocks as in the Barmby et al model, and has the opportunity 
to reserve UI benefit days and avoid job search by collecting SI benefits, it 
reasonable to expect that the reservation level of sickness decreases as the 
worker approaches the expiration date, implying a higher probability to switch 
to and stay on SI benefits.  
In sum, combining the results from the theories of absenteeism and job 
search, we would expect an increase in the SI benefits in relation to UI benefits 
                                                      
8 For modifications of the Mortensen (1977) model, see for example Burdett (1979), Mortensen 
(1990) and van den Berg (1990, 1994). 
9 Carling et al (1996) incorporate labour market programmes into the model and show that the 
size of the effect on the exit rate to employment now depends on how the unemployed value the 
programmes. The empirical evidence for Sweden indicates that even in the presence of such 
programmes, exit rate to employment increases as the unemployed approach the date for UI 
benefit expiration. IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  8
to have a positive effect on the unemployed workers’ probability of a transition 
from UI to SI, and on the duration of the subsequent SI period. Moreover, we 
would expect the transition rates from UI to SI, as well as the duration of SI 
spells, to be higher for workers that are close to UI benefit expiration. 
 
 
4  Data and sampling  
4.1 Data 
Data for the empirical analysis are obtained from LINDA (stands for 
longitudinal individual database), which is a register-based database with about 
300,000 individuals (for a detailed description of LINDA, see Edin et al, 2001). 
The two main data sources for this analysis (both of which are in LINDA) are 
unemployment period data (AKSTAT) from unemployment insurance funds, 
and sickness period register (sjukfallsregister, SFR) from the National Social 
Insurance Board. Demographic variables collected from other data sources are 
also included in LINDA. 
AKSTAT
10 consists of four tables per calendar year that contain information 
on all benefit payment decisions for unemployed people who are entitled to 
either basic-amount or income-related UI benefits.
11 Each UI benefit payment, 
which is paid out weekly, is regulated by two decisions: one determines the 
size of the benefit, based on previous wages; the other determines the duration 
of the benefit. In principle, each insured, unemployed person is entitled to 
receive compensation for 300 workdays (450 workdays for people ages 57 or 
older). But, these benefit days can be paid out for several unconnected spells of 
unemployment, which often results in a new spell starting with less than 300 
(450) workdays.  
Moreover, the benefit level may also change between two unemployment 
spells, given that the person has worked and earned a different wage. So at the 
                                                      
10 A National Labour Market Board database: the AKSTAT contains administrative information 
taken from the various unemployment benefit funds. This includes information on funds that are 
paying unemployment benefits, the amounts paid, and wages from previous employment. 
AKSTAT was established in 1994. 
11 Most benefit payments in AKSTAT refer to UI benefit payments, either income-related or 
basic-amount, for those people who are openly unemployed. In addition, UI funds pay 
allowances for some of the active labour market programmes available to the unemployed. But 
during the study period, the extent of these programmes was very small. IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  9
start of an unemployment period, to determine the number of remaining days 
until the UI benefits expire, all previous periods that belong to the same 300 
(450) workdays’ decision must be traced back to the date of the decision. This 
data must then be combined with information on the actual size of the benefit’s 
decision to determine the amount of the UI benefit during the unemployment 
period in question.  
SFR includes records on SI benefits for all individuals who are entitled to 
them, including employed and unemployed people. For each sick report, start 
and end dates are included along with information on the type and extent of the 
benefit. Regular SI benefits for illnesses, rehabilitation benefits, and benefits 
for preventive care are examples of the type  of benefit, whereas the extent 
defines whether or not the benefit is paid out on a full-time or part-time basis. 
Most periods are for full-time, regular SI benefits for illnesses. The data also 
include information on the previous wage, which defines the level of the SI 
benefit. But the data do not include additional detailed information on medical 
diagnoses or other indications on the state of the illnesses.  
Combining AKSTAT with SFR results in a database with unemployment 
spells for the 1994-1997 period, and both UI and SI spells for the 1997-1999 
period. Figure 2 illustrates an example. The gaps in the figure imply some 
activity other than UI or SI, for example, work, studies or active labour market 
programmes, but no additional information is provided in the data.
12 Of course, 
not all of the unemployed are observed sick during the study period: each year, 
about 20-23 % of about 30,000 unemployed also have a SI spell during the 








                                                      
12 Labour market programmes could, in principle, be observed by combining the data with 
records from the local employment offices (HÄNDEL). But attempts to combine these data sets 
have revealed that they do not match well. Even if combined with HÄNDEL, the data would still 
not include, e.g., employment spells, and thus for the purpose of this study, the cost of combining 
the data – the loss of observations that do not match – is considered higher than the benefit. IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  10










4.2 Sampling  procedure 
All people who begin an open unemployment spell with UI benefits 
between January 1998 and August 1999 were selected from AKSTAT.
13 Thus 
SI and UI benefit payments during 1997 are used as control variables to 
eliminate heterogeneity bias in the empirical analysis.
14 These people are then 
followed from the start of the UI spell until their transition to SI benefits. For 
simplicity, all SI payments are considered the same, irrespective of the type or 
extent of the payment.  
UI spells that end for some reason other than sickness are treated as 
censored – as the 1998 UI spell of the example person demonstrates in 
Figure 2. The first part of the analysis focuses on the probability of changing 
from UI to SI benefits. In the second part, the sub-sample of people who have 
switched to SI benefits is then used to study the probability of people returning 
to UI benefits.  
Collecting the inflow to UI benefits between January 1998 and August 1999 
results in a sample size of 17,951 individuals, out of which 829 (4.6  %) 
changed from UI to SI benefits. But some of the observations are excluded, 
either due to deficient data quality or to reduce heterogeneity in the sample. For 
example, the people entitled to 450 workdays of UI compensation are 
excluded. Differences in the maximum duration of benefits may have an effect 
                                                      
13 The UI benefit data are reported weekly, and thus the exact inflow is restricted to 5 January 
1998 – 3 September 1999. Appendix A contains a detailed description of the sampling procedure. 
14 To be strict, conditioning on previous UI and SI benefit periods and treating them as 
predetermined variables is valid only in the absence of unobservable heterogeneity (for example 
in terms of health) among the individuals. Section 5 describes how the identification of the 
expiration effect and the effect of various ceilings takes into account the potential systematic 
health differences among individuals.  
1997 
UI 
1998  1999 
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on the behaviour of the unemployed. Moreover, the behaviour of people close 
to the age of retirement may differ from the behaviour of younger people due to 
different choices concerning, for example, sickness pensions and early 
retirement pensions.  
Eventually, the sample size is reduced to 12,538 UI spells (sample A in 
Table 1), including 575 transitions to SI benefits. The transition from SI to UI 
is studied with a sample of 575 people (sample B in Table 1), out of which 311 
return to UI benefits. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics on selected individual 
characteristics in the two samples: individuals who report sick are, on average, 
older, less educated, and have been sick and unemployed to a greater extent 
during the previous year, compared with the total sample of the unemployed. 
The proportion of women is also higher in the sample of sick.  
 IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  12
Table 1 Sample characteristics (means) 
  Sample A: unemployed  Sample B: sick 
Demographics     
Age 34.6  38.8 
Female 0.580  0.619 
Non-Nordic citizen  0.118  0.144 
Married 0.314  0.353 
Children, age 15 or younger  0.336  0.362 
Children, age 16  or older  0.049  0.064 
    
Length of education    
Compulsory 0.201  0.304 
Upper secondary, max 2 years  0.381  0.409 
Upper secondary, 3-4 years  0.206  0.139 
University 0.207  0.143 
Missing 0.005  0.005 
Type of education     
General 0.275  0.365 
Aesthetic, classical  0.043  0.028 
Pedagogic 0.046  0.033 
Administration, trade  0.118  0.179 
Industrial, handicraft  0.205  0.186 
Transport, communication  0.013  0.019 
Social and health care  0.121  0.093 
Agriculture, woods, fishing  0.018  0.014 
Service, civil guard, military  0.047  0.042 
Missing, non-assignable  0.045  0.040 
    
UI benefits, 1 year prior    
None 0.484  0.469 
1-50 days  0.247  0.129 
51-100 days  0.128  0.127 
More than 100 days  0.141  0.275 
UI benefits, 2 years prior    
None 0.485  0.352 
1-50 days  0.180  0.111 
51-100 days  0.139  0.113 
More than 100 days  0.276  0.424 
Basic amount, 1 (2) year(s) 
prior 
0.007 (0.004)  0.002 (0.002) 
SI benefits, 1 year prior    
None 0.810  0.502 
1-50 days  0.140  0.315 
51-100 days  0.026  0.075 
More than 100 days  0.024  0.108 
No. of individuals  12,538  575 IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  13
Table 2 presents some characteristics of the pre-unemployment wage 
distributions, based on the information collected from AKSTAT. With respect 
to wages, the samples are very similar, implying that individuals with wages 
high enough to benefit from reporting sick are not over-represented among the 
sick in the raw data.  
 
Table 2 Previous wage characteristics 
  Sample A: unemployed  Sample B: sick  
Monthly wage (MW), mean  14,392  14,194 
Proportion of individuals with:     
MW ≤ 15,950   0.685 0.699 
15,950 < MW ≤ 22,750/23,250*   0.291 0.273 
MW > 22,750/23,250*   0.024  0.028 
Note: In AKSTAT, information on previous wages is reported either as an hourly, daily, weekly 
or monthly wage and marked with a code that indicates the type of wage. The variable monthly 
wage (MW) is then calculated according to this formula: MW = (22/5)*weekly wage; MW = 
22*daily wage; MW = 22*8*hourly wage. Due to incorrect types of wage codes, some 
observations of MW are clearly too high. So in the empirical analysis, observations with absurdly 
high wages are excluded. The limit is set to SEK 50,000 per month, but even other specifications 
are tested without any significant effect on the results 
* The limit for maximum SI benefits was SEK 22,750 in 1998 and SEK 23,250 in 1999. 
 
Besides wages, a variable of main interest is the number of days until the 
expiration date of the UI benefits at the start of unemployment and sick spells. 
Table 3 reveals considerable variation in that regard: nearly half of the 
unemployment spells start with less than 270 benefit days remaining. 
Figure 3 presents the evolution of the empirical hazard rate for changing to 
SI benefits with respect to the number of days until the UI benefits expire. Note 
that time measures the distance to the expiration date. There is an upward trend 
in the transition rate, indicating a growing tendency to report sick as the 
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Table 3 UI and SI spell characteristics 
  Sample A: UI spells  Sample B: SI spells 
Proportion of spells lasting 
more than: 
  
1 week  84.4  62.6 
4 weeks  61.8  38.4 
8 weeks  45.4  26.6 
12 weeks  30.1  21.6 
26 weeks  11.1  12.7 
52 weeks  2.1  6.4 
    
Proportion of spells that start 
with No. of days until UI 
benefit expiration: 
  
Less than 31 days   2.8  11.0 
31-90 days  5.9  13.2 
91-150 days  8.9  14.8 
151-210 days  11.8  19.8 
211-270 days  17.7  22.8 
More than 270 days  53.0  19.5 
    
Transition to SI benefits no. (%)  575 (4.6)   
Transition to UI benefits no. (%)    311 (54.1) 
Censored 2.9  13.9 
No. of spells  12,538  575 
 

















Days until UI benefit expiration
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Finally, sick reports vary remarkably over a year. Figure 4 presents the 
number of sick reports among the unemployed during each month of 1999, 
divided by the average stock of unemployed people that month, relative to sick 
reports in January. The dotted line represents the total number of sick reports, 
again relative to January, of both employed and unemployed people. The figure 
reveals similar patterns for both groups: sick-report rates are highest between 
January and March and lowest during the summer months.  
 
Figure 4 Seasonal variations in sick reports 
 
Note: Data are obtained from the SFR that are included in the LINDA database. The number of 
sick reports among the unemployed is calculated as (number of direct flows from UI to SI in a 
month)/(average stock of UI recipients each week that month). The number of sick reports in 
January 1999 was 9,425 in the entire LINDA population, and 376 among the UI recipients. 
 
 
5 Empirical  analysis 
5.1 Identification  strategy 
The empirical analysis consists of two parts: (1) the transition from UI to SI 
benefits and (2) the return from SI to UI benefits, i.e. the length of the sick 
period. The empirical strategy is to analyse data in terms of a discrete hazard 
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() () 1 ,..., 1 , , , , Pr , , − = ≥ = = k t wage UIdays x t T t T wage UIdays x t h    (12) 
 
where T = t denotes failure in the [t-1, t) interval.  () wage UIdays x t h , , i s  t h u s  
the conditional probability of failure in that interval, given that the interval is 
reached and given a vector of time-constant covariates x, the number of days 
until the UI benefits expiration UIdays, and previous wage that determines the 
level of UI and SI benefits; k is the maximum spell length.
15 First, when focus 
is on the transition from UI to SI benefits, time measures the length of the UI 
spell, and failure is exit from UI to SI benefits. When focus is on the transition 
back to unemployment, time measures the length of the SI spell, and failure is 
exit from SI to UI benefits. 
The effect of the UI benefit expiration is identified by the variation in the 
initial number of benefit days at the start of each unemployment spell. This 
variation allows us to separate the expiration effect from the duration of the 
unemployment spell. Thus the number of days until benefit expiration, UIdays, 
is included in the hazard function for UI spells as a time-variant variable, 
diminishing by one for each day of unemployment. Moreover, in the hazard for 
SI spells, I include the number of remaining days at the start of the spell as a 
time-invariant variable. In the equation for transition from UI to SI, we would 
expect the parameter estimate of UIdays to be negative: the more days that are 
left until expiration, the smaller the probability of sick reports. On the contrary, 
in the equation for transition from SI to UI, UIdays is expected to obtain a 
positive sign. 
The strong connection between income and health as documented in a series 
of studies makes it difficult to identify the effect of differing benefit ceilings.
16 
As discussed in the theoretical section, we would expect a higher probability of 
sickness for people above the UI benefit ceiling due to economic incentives. 
But higher income is shown to imply better health for the individual, indicating 
a lower probability of sickness for those above the ceiling. A challenge for the 
empirical strategy is thus to separate the incentive or ceiling effect from the 
health effect.  
                                                      
15 For an overview of duration models, see e.g., Fahrmeier and Tutz (1994), Lancaster (1990) and 
Kiefer (1988).  
16 For a summary of studies concerning the interplay between health and labour market 
outcomes, see Currie and Madrian (1999). IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  17
The general identification strategy I use is to let the effect of previous wages 
vary below and above the UI benefit ceiling. Recall from Figure 1 that the 
samples could be divided into three categories on the basis of the potential 
benefits from a SI period. In wage categories I and III, a change in wage does 
not alter the benefits from reporting sick in relation to UI benefits, whereas in 
category II, the benefits from a sick period increase as wages increase. 
Previous wages are included in hazard equations as a spline function with 
knots at the threshold values that equal to the ceiling values for UI and SI 
benefits. Thus consider the following equation of the hazard rate h(t): 
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where h0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, and f(.) is a function of the time-
invariant covariates x and time-varying covariates z(t). D
II and D
III are dummies 
for the wage categories, such that D
II = 1 if wage > SEK 15,950 = 
*
II w , and 
D
III = 1 if wage > SEK 22,750 = 
*
III w  during 1998, wage > SEK 23,250 = 
*
III w  
during 1999. Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, there are no discrete jumps at the 
threshold values in the difference between UI and SI benefits, and thus the 
spline function is restricted to be continuous. In other words, the segments are 
required to join at the knots, implying 
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Equations (14a) and (14b) imply linear restrictions on the parameters β, δII and 
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where  β captures the wage effect for individuals with wages in category I; 
(β + δII) for those in category II; and (β + δII + δIII) for those in category III. IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  18
(Wage - 
*
III w ) is included in the estimations as a time-variant variable to allow 
for the discrete change in the ceiling value of 
*
III w from 22,750 to 23,250 in the 
turn of the year 1998-1999. 
The model is estimated in discrete time, assuming that both the hazard and 
the factors do not change within each time-interval. The log-likelihood 
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t du u h η . In the first part of the analysis, c i = 1 indicates the 
transition to SI benefits; in the second part, a return to UI benefits. The function 
is maximised with respects to its arguments.
17 The baseline hazard from UI to 
SI is estimated for time-intervals of 4 weeks up to 16 weeks.
18  
Besides the specification shown in equation (16), a specification with two 
splines is estimated, implying D
III = 0, such that the two categories, II and III, 
that imply a possibility to gain from a SI period, are treated as one. 
 
5.2 Empirical  results 
Table 4 reports the estimated results for the transition from UI benefits to SI 
benefits. Appendix B presents the estimates for the baseline hazard. The four 
first lines in the table present the variables of chief interest: β, δII and δIII, which 
                                                      
17 This model is found, e.g., in Carling et al. (1996) and with minor modifications in Andersson 
and Vejsiu (2001). Asymptotic standard errors are calculated by using the BHHH estimator. 
18 The time intervals in the baseline hazard from SI to UI are 2, 4, and 4 weeks up to 10 weeks. 
In the UI period data, one week corresponds to 5 days, and in the SI period data, one week 
corresponds to 7 days.  IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  19
are the components for the estimated wage effects in the three intervals; and 
days until UI expiration. Columns (1)-(3) report results for a specification with 
two splines – all individuals who can benefit from reporting sick are treated as 
one – whereas results for a specification with different splines for those below 
and above the SI ceiling are presented in column (4).  
The parameter estimates for β, δII and δIII indicate that there is a difference 
in the effect of wages on the hazard to SI benefits between individuals with 
wages below and above the ceiling for UI benefits. An increase in wages of 
SEK  1,000 implies a decrease in the sickness rate with 3.2-4.1  % for 
individuals with a wage below the UI benefit ceiling, whereas for those above 
the ceiling, the effect of wage increases on the transition rate to SI, (β + δII), is 
non-existent as long as the group above the ceiling is treated as one.
19  
Introduction of the third spline provides further support for the incentives 
effect: the wage effects are shown to be positive, but only for the group with 
wages above the UI ceiling, but below the SI ceiling. The parameter estimates 
in column (4) imply that for this group, an increase in wages by 
SEK 1,000 increases the sick-report rate by about 7.5 %. For people above the 
SI ceiling, the sick rate decreases by slightly more than 6  % due to a 
corresponding wage rise.  
This result is expected: people with wages between the ceilings are the only 
ones whose SI benefits increase in relation to UI benefits as wages increase. 
For people in the highest and lowest wage categories, the surplus between SI 
and UI benefits is not changed by a wage increase. Consequently, for these 
groups, the wage effect should only consist of the health effect, and thus be 
estimated negative. 
For the benefit expiration effect, the results also correspond to what the 
theoretical discussion implied. The estimated effect of a 10 more days until the 
benefit expiration varies between –0.034 and –0.038, which implies that being 
10 days closer to expiration is associated with about a 3-4 % higher sick-report 
rate. Statistically, this effect is highly significant and robust across the 
specifications. 
                                                      
19 The percentage effect is calculated as  () [] 1 exp * 100
*





, where λ* - λ is the 
difference in the hazard rate when the variable X is increased by n units.  
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Among the other variables, a person’s SI benefit history is a strong, 
significant factor in explaining the sick-report rate. Those with 1-50 sick days 
before the actual unemployment spell during the last year are almost three 
times as likely to report sick as individuals who never had sick days. Moreover, 
an increase in the number of sick days is associated with a higher sick-report 
rate.  
In contrast with previous sick days, having any UI benefits during the last 
year is associated with the same, or slightly lower, sick-report rate as compared 
to no unemployment days at all. This, together with the clearly negative 
estimate for days until benefit expiration, supports the hypothesis that it is not 
unemployment per se that increases the sick-report rate, but the approaching 
expiration date. 
As in many previous studies, the sick-report rate is found to be increasing 
for people who are older, and higher for women than for men. The results 
indicate further that non-Nordic citizens have lower sick-report rates, though 
the parameter estimate is not statistically significant.  
The regional dummies capture high sick rates in the northern parts of 
Sweden, as reported in Appendix B. In relation to other counties, living in a 
forest county increases the expected sick-report rate of an unemployed person 
by more than 60 %. Results for the seasonal dummies are similar to Figure 4: 
the probability of the transition to SI benefits is highest early in a year. Among 
the demographic variables, marital status and the existence of children do not 
appear to play an important role for sick reports.  
Finally, none of the educational variables in columns (4) and (5) turns out to 
play a significant role. This is somewhat surprising, because education level 
should reflect the socio-economic status of the individual, which in turn is 
shown to be positively correlated with health (as shown in a series of previous 
studies). What may be less surprising is that the type of education does not 
have a significant effect: it is mainly included as a proxy for the industry that 
the individual worked for before unemployment, but the correlation between 
them is probably very low. 
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Table 4 Estimated results, transition to SI benefits. Standard errors in italics. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wage effect (SEK 1,000):      
β  -.033 .014 -.037 .014 -.035 .015 -.042 .015 
δII   .033 .028 .045  .028 .055  .029 .114  .039 
δIII  - - -  -.135  .069 
Days until UI expiration (10 days) -.034 .005 -.035 .005 -.038 .005 -.038 .005 
      
Regional  dummies*  yes yes yes yes 
Dummies for quarter of inflow*  yes  yes  yes  yes 
      
Demographic characteristics      
Age   .032  .005 .024  .005 .023  .005 
Female   .414  .129 .388  .132 .411  .133 
Non-Nordic citizen    -.099 .136 -.176 .137 -.171 .137 
Married   -.310  .181 -.293 .184 -.289 .185 
   Married and female    .233 .210 .301  .213 .296  .213 
Children, age 15 or younger    .058 .175 .072  .173 .078  .177 
   Children, age 15 and female    .055 .207 -.022  .208 -.029 .210 
Children, age 16 or older    .264 .305 .373  .308 .342  .308 
   Children, age 16 and female    -.348 .378 -.497 .397 -.462 .379 
      
Length of education      
Compulsory   .234  .204 .143  .206 .145  .206 
Upper secondary, max 2 years    ref.  ref.  ref. 
Upper secondary, 3-4 years    -.215 .141 -.127 .143 -.130 .143 
University   -.459  .153 -.262 .155 -.273  .155 
Missing   .084  .635 .389  .206 .400  .643 
Type of education*    yes yes yes 
      
UI benefits, 1 year prior      
1-50 days      -.572 .159 -.580 .159 
51-100 days      -.271 .162 -.282 .162 
More than 100 days      -.015 .135 -.028 .155 
UI benefits, 2 years prior      
1-50 days      -.036 .165 -.019 .166 
51-100 days      -.069 .162 -.060 .162 
More than 100 days      .147 .135 .166  .135 
Basic amount, 1 (2) year(s) prior*    Yes  yes 
SI benefits, 1 year prior      
1-50 days      1.06 .100 1.07  .101 
51-100 days      1.24 .170 1.25  .170 
More than 100 days      1.77 .147 1.79  .147 
Log-likelihood  -4,520 -4,464 -4,342 -4,340 
* Results reported in Appendix B. 
 IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  22
Turning to the second part of the empirical analysis, Table 5 reports the 
estimated results for the return rates from SI to UI benefits. Appendix B 
presents estimates for the baseline hazard. Again, the variables of main interest 
are the three wage variables and the days until the UI benefits expire.  
The hypothesis that being above the maximum UI benefit level would imply 
longer SI spells cannot be accepted; if anything, it should be rejected. Though 
statistically insignificant, a positive point estimate of δII implies that the 
estimated effect of wages may be more positive above, rather than below, the 
UI ceiling. This indicates that an increase in the wage is associated with either 
the same or a relatively higher return rate – and thus shorter SI spell – for those 
who would gain from having a relatively longer SI spell. 
The benefit-expiration effect is estimated positive as expected. But with 
such large standard errors, the hypothesis – that having fewer days left until 
expiration is associated with longer SI spells – cannot be accepted either. 
Among the other variables, only age seems to have a statistically significant 
effect on the length of a SI spell: an extra year implies about a 2 % lower 
probability of returning to UI benefits. Standard errors for all other parameter 
estimates are very large. Thus based on these results, the general conclusion is 
that very little can be said about what influences the length of a sick spell 
during unemployment. Why is that? 
The relatively small sample size of about 600 people is a potential 
explanation. But I consider it difficult to increase the sample size even if the 
data contain information about several sick spells. For the purpose of this 
study, which is to examine the interplay between UI and SI systems, I want to 
be sure that UI benefits are the alternative income source for the sick person. 
Thus I am only interested in those sick spells preceded by insured 
unemployment. Table A1 in the Appendix shows data that include 3,769 such 
people. But I see an advantage in terms of reducing heterogeneity by using the 
same sample to study both the transition from UI to SI, and vice versa. After 
all, the question is how the structure of the insurance systems affects the 
probability of both becoming sick and staying sick. A potential subject for 
future studies is however to apply another sampling method to analyse the 
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Table 5 Estimated results, transition to UI benefits. Standard errors in italics. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Wage effect (SEK 1,000):       
β  .008 .020 .006  .021 .006  .022 .006  .022 
δII   .008 .039 .034  .039 .031  .040 .028  .040 
δIII  - - -  .007  .088  
Days until UI expiration (10 days) .004 .006 .002  .006 .005  .007 .005  .007 
      
Regional dummies*  yes  yes   yes  yes 
Dummies  for  quarterly  inflow*  yes yes yes yes 
      
Demographic characteristics      
Age   -.017  .007 -.016 .007 -.016 .007 
Female   -.082  .182 -.080 .187 -.082 .189 
Non-Nordic citizen    -.104 .187 -.114 .188 -.115 .188 
Married   -.282  .269 -.294 .272 -.293 .274 
   Married and female    .283 .307 .307  .310 .305  .311 
Children, age 15 or younger    .147 .235 .155  .240 .152  .245 
   Children, age 15 and female    .035 .281 .023  .288 .023  .288 
Children, age 16 or older    .663 .403 .652  .404 .654  .404 
   Children, age 16 and female    -.741 .501 -.694 .505 -.695 .505 
      
Length of education      
Compulsory   -.090  .274 -.078 .276 -.077 .276 
Upper secondary, max 2 years    ref.  ref.  ref. 
Upper secondary, 3-4 years    -.075 .203 -.110 .206 -.109 .206 
University   .085  .200 .063  .203 .064  .203 
Missing   -1.34  1.08 -1.34 1.08 -1.34 1.08 
Type of education    yes yes yes 
      
UI benefits, 1 year prior      
1-50 days      .074 .206 .074  .206 
51-100 days      .186 .197 .186  .197 
More than 100 days      .081 .160 .081  .160 
SI benefits, 1 year prior      
1-50 days      -.088 .139 -.089 .139 
51-100 days      .240 .256 .240  .256 
More than 100 days      -.335 .230 -.336 .230 
Log-likelihood  -1,529.00 -1,516.58 -1,513.90 -1,513.89 
Note: Due to a small sample size, a reduced number of control variables were included. So 
dummies for UI benefits two years prior and basic amount benefits, which did not turn out to be 
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5.3  How robust are the results? 
One of the key concerns in this study is identification of the ceiling effect: are 
the sick-report rates higher and subsequent sick periods longer for people with 
wages above the threshold value? The chosen strategy is to let the effect of 
wages vary between different wage categories, both below and above the 
threshold as defined by the institutional framework. Concerning the transition 
from UI to SI, the results show a significant difference, which is then taken as 
evidence for the ceiling effect on the probability of sickness among the 
unemployed. 
To check the robustness of this result, I estimated specifications with 
various threshold values and report the results in Table 6. To begin with, I 
estimate a specification with the two old knots at the ceiling values, plus two 
additional thresholds: one below the UI ceiling at a wage equal to SEK 10,950; 
and one between the UI and SI ceilings at a wage equal to SEK 18,950. The 
results in column two support the original results for the three spline 
specifications in column one: the threshold values equal to the UI and SI 
ceilings are the most important for the variation in the wage effect. The 
parameter estimates in column two are no longer statistically significant, but 
nevertheless, they indicate that the wage effect is more positive in the interval 
between the two ceilings than outside of it.  
Columns three to five present estimated wage effects in two spline 
specifications when the threshold is varied within the interval (14,950; 16,950). 
We would expect the difference between the wage effects to be smaller for 
threshold values that are slightly below or above the true ceiling value of 
15,950, because the groups are contaminated. But this is not the case: the 
estimated wage effects are more or less the same in all three columns. How 
should this be interpreted? 
The rules for the UI and SI benefit payments provide a potential 
explanation. UI compensation is paid out for workdays only, with a maximum 
of five days a week. The sum of annual earnings, divided by the sum of 
workdays per year, determines the size of the daily UI compensation. SI 
benefits, however, are paid out seven days a week, with the size determined by 
the sum of the annual wage divided by 365. Consequently, the amount of 
received SI benefits depend on whether the sick period lasts over a weekend or 
not. For example, compensation from SI is higher for a sick period from 
Thursday until Monday, than from Monday until Wednesday, even though the 
number of workdays – and thus the lost UI benefits – are the same.  IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  25
The crucial consequence of these rules – which can explain the results in 
Table 6 – is that even unemployed people with previous wages below 
SEK 15,950 may benefit from sick periods that last for more than a weekend, 
whereas people with previous wages that are slightly above the ceiling do not 
benefit from sick periods that fall during the middle of the week.
20  
 
Table 6 Wage effects with various threshold values (TV), transition to SI 
benefits. Standard errors in italics.  
 Several  splines: Two  splines: 















        
β  -.042 .015 -.041  .028 -.039  .016  -.035  .015 -.032  .014 
δII    -.003  .053 .056  .028 .055  .029 .054  .030 
δIII  .114 .039 .128  .084      
δIV    -.026  .126      















6 Concluding  remarks 
This paper focuses on the interplay between unemployment insurance and 
sickness insurance, two major parts of Sweden’s social insurance system. The 
specifications of these two insurance programs provide possibilities for benefit 
arbitrage: by reporting sick, an unemployed person with previously high wages 
receives an SI benefit that is higher than an UI benefit. The empirical analysis 
presents some evidence for the arbitrage hypothesis: an increase in wages 
seems to have a different effect on the sick-report rate for unemployed people 
                                                      
20 The data do not include that many sick spells that occur over the weekend. Among the 
unemployed, Tuesday seems to be the most usual day to report sick, and Friday is the day when 
sick spells seem to end. Among the employed, sick spells start more often on Monday and end on 
Friday. See Johansson and Palme, (2000).  IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  26
who can benefit from reporting sick, than for those who cannot. But no such 
difference is found for the length of a sick spell. 
A wage increase has a significantly negative effect on the sick-report rate  
for low-wage earners (those below the threshold for maximum UI benefits) and 
high-wage earners (those above the threshold for maximum SI benefits). This 
reflects the well-known correlation between high income and good health. But 
for people whose wages fall between these two thresholds, the wage effect on 
the sick-report rate is clearly positive. This is the only group whose relative 
compensation of SI compared to UI benefits increase as wages increase. 
Thus given that the connection between health and income is strong for all 
wage levels, the statistically significant difference in the estimated slope 
concerning the sick-report rate can be interpreted as evidence for an incentive 
effect that works in the opposite direction from the health effect. To my 
knowledge, no previous studies have found that the health effect (the positive 
correlation between health and wages) would only exist for the lowest and 
highest wage levels but not for middle wages. Thus I find it plausible to 
conclude that the unequal structure of these two insurance systems seems to 
imply an increase in the number of sick reports.  
I do not, however, find evidence for such an incentive effect that would 
lengthen the sick periods. In other words, economic incentives seem to play a 
different role for the choice to stay on SI benefits than for the choice to switch 
to SI benefits. It may be that the increased benefit from collecting SI lowers the 
threshold for a few days’ sick period due to minor illness, thereby decreasing 
the average length of SI periods. After all, regional social insurance offices 
require a doctor’s certificate to pay out more than a week’s worth of 
compensation, which implies that it may be difficult to let other factors besides 
health determine the length of a SI spell.  
But all of the parameter estimates in the model have very large standard 
errors, possibly due to a relatively small sample size. So very little can be said 
about what determines the length of a sick spell. Thus a subject for future 
research is to analyse the length of a sick spell in more detail, using a larger 
sample, and separate from the probability of occurrence.  
Furthermore, the empirical analysis clearly demonstrates that the probability 
of a sick report increases the closer a person is to the expiration date of UI 
benefits. The economic explanation is that SI benefits are used as means to 
save UI benefit days, and thus, to postpone the drop in income after all of the 
UI benefit days are used. The need to postpone becomes more obvious as the IFAU – Sick of being unemployed?  27
expiration date approaches, thereby increasing the willingness to report sick on 
the few UI benefit days that remain. 
Of course, the approaching drop in income may cause stress, which in turn 
may have effects on the person’s actual health. Thus the possibility that at least 
some part of the increase in sick reports is explained by increased illness 
cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, the result adds to the practically non-existent 
knowledge on sickness behaviour among the unemployed in Sweden. 
But one should note that this study is a partial equilibrium analysis. The 
results do not indicate how the total number of sick reports would change if the 
benefits were harmonised, and neither can they be used to predict the effect of 
a changed duration of UI benefits on statistics about sickness among the 
unemployed. Such extensive reforms would most likely have effects on many 
transitions in the labour market, besides those between UI and SI. The 
economic significance of the results is thus not obvious.  
In sum, this study serves above all as a first glance at the data, pointing to 
some interesting patterns in the behaviour of the unemployed. More analysis, 
both theoretical and empirical, is still needed before we can draw distinct 
conclusions about which mechanisms cause this behaviour. A more thorough 
analysis of the duration of SI periods, a comparative study of SI periods among 
the unemployed and employed workers, and development of a theoretical 
model are examples of topics for future work. 
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Appendix A 
Sample construction 
Table A1 illustrates the various steps in the sampling procedure. First, people 
observed using AKSTAT during the 1998-1999 study period are collected. The 
spells observed in AKSTAT are open unemployment with income-related UI 
benefits (BERSTYP=2), open unemployment with basic amount 
(BERSTYP=12), uncompensated qualifying period of five days (BERSTYP=1), 
or participation in these four active labour market programmes: work 
experience scheme (arbetslivsutveckling ALU, BERSTYP=3 or 13); temporary 
public work for older people (offentligt tillfälligt arbete OTA, BERSTYP=4, 14 
or 44); project work (projektarbete, BERSTYP=6 or 16); and temporary 
severance pay (tillfälligt avgångsersättning TAE, BERSTYP=7, 17 or 23). Thus 
far, no regard is paid to the type of spell. 
From the beginning, it is required that they are included in LINDA for all 
three years – 1997, 1998 and 1999 – to maximise chances to be able to observe 
their previous UI spells. The sample of 33,436 people with at least one spell 
during 1998-1999 is then merged with SFR (SJUKFALLSREGISTRET) by 
using the personal ID code (BIDNR) common to AKSTAT, SFR, and LINDA.  
During 1998-1999, 10,680 people were observed with AKSTAT and SFR. 
But most cases, UI and SI spells are not directly connected to one other: only 
4,650 spells have a direct transition from AKSTAT to SFR, and only 3,769 
have changed from open unemployment with UI benefits (BERSTYP=2) to SI 
benefits. No regard is paid to the type (FALLKOD) or extent of the SI benefits. 
FALLKOD takes these values: (1) for regular SI benefits for illness; (3) for 
rehabilitation; (4) for preventive SI benefits; (5) for SI benefits for students; 
and various combinations of all of these. The extent of SI benefits is either (1) 
full-time, (3) three-quarters, (2) half-time or (4) one-quarter. 
Between 5 January 1998 and 3 September 1999, 17,951 people have a UI 
spell as openly unemployed (hereafter referred to as UI spell), and sooner or 
later, about 4.6  % of these people change directly to SI benefits. But as 
reported in Table 1, the sample size is diminished by 5,413 persons, resulting in 
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Table A1 Sample construction 
No. of people observed in AKSTAT during 1998-1999  33,436 
No. of people observed in both AKSTAT and SFR during 1998-1999  10,680 
No. of people with at least one transition from AKSTAT to SI 
benefits 
4,650 
No. of people with at least one transition from open unemployment 
with UI benefits (BERSTYP=2) to SI benefits 
3,769 
No. of transitions from AKSTAT to SI benefits  7,421 
No. of transitions from open unemployment with UI to SI benefits  5,341 
  No. of spells  No. of spells 
with exit to SI 
UI spell starting 5 January 1998 – 3 September 1999 17,951 829 
Sample size after following exclusions:   
UI or SI spell history 1994-1997 incorrect   17,801 818 
Impossible to calculate days until UI expiration, 
decision not traced back to 1994-1997 AKSTAT  16,913
 
767 
Days until UI expiration negative  15,908 707 
Days until UI expiration more than 450  15,870 701 
UI spell length non-positive  13,691 687 
450 allowed days (for people 54/57 years of age 
or older) 
12,633 576 
Days until UI expiration more than 310  12,569 575 
Previous wage higher than SEK 50,000**  12,538 575 
Note: I collected only people who are included in all three LINDA samples from 1997-1999. 
Most of the LINDA sample is unchanged from year to year, but a small fraction is replaced 
because some people die or emigrate, and new cohorts and immigrants are collected into the 
sample.  
* Until now, I have not applied an age restriction. The age varies between 18 and 66 years. 
** Specifications where previous wages are imputed, instead of excluding the 31 observations, 
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Appendix B 
Table B1 Estimates for the baseline hazard, educational, regional and 
seasonal variables, transition to SI benefits. Standard errors in italics. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regional dummies*:      
City county  -.059 .097 .012 .100 .043  .101 .049  .101 
Forest county   .381 .118 .457  .121 .491  .122 .496  .122 
Other  ref. ref. ref. ref. 
      
Quarter of inflow into UI**:       
January-March .296  .097 .286  .100 .139  .104 .139  .104 
April-June  ref. ref. ref. ref. 
July-September .122  .124 .196  .127 .156  .131 .153  .131 
October-December .311  .162 .398  .165 .291  .176 .280  .176 
      
Type of education:      
General   ref.  ref.  ref. 
Aesthetic, classical    -.217 .328 -.204 .330 -.212 .331 
Pedagogic   .246  .314 .193  .315 .192  .315 
Administration, trade    .099 .204 .040  .206 .037  .206 
Industrial, handicraft    .118 .207 -.017  .209 -.036 .209 
Transport, communication    .336 .362 .270  .366 .274  .366 
Social and health care    .028 .230 -.018  .209 -.016 .232 
Agriculture, woods, fishing    .096 .407 .091  .414 .089  .415 
Service, civil guard, military    -.089 .278 -.141 .281 -.127 .281 
Missing, non-assignable    .137 .289 -.036  .298 -.030 .298  
      
Baseline:      
1-20 workdays  -5.50 .219 -6.88 .352 -6.73 .378 -6.67 .378 
21-40 workdays  -6.40 .232 -7.82 .364 -7.63 .388 -7.57 .389 
41-60 workdays  -6.78 .248 -8.21 .380 -8.08 .401 -8.02 .401 
61-80 workdays  -6.78 .260 -8.21 .384 -8.13 .408 -8.08 .408 
81-418 workdays  -7.05 .223 -8.58 .366 -8.54 .383 -8.48 .383 
No.  of  observations  12,538 12,538 12,538 12,538 
* City counties are Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö (LAN=1, 12, 14). Forest counties are 
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Table B2 Estimates for the baseline hazard, educational, regional and 
seasonal variables, transition to UI benefits. Standard errors in italics. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Regional dummies*:      
City county  -.109 .130 -.079 .136 -.073 .137 -.074 .137 
Forest county   -.002 .162 -.075 .169 -.092 .172 -.093 .172 
Other  ref. ref. ref. ref. 
      
Quarter of inflow into UI:       
January-March -.092  .156 -.090 .165 -.087 .166 -.088 .166 
April-June  ref. ref. ref. ref. 
July-September -.221  .163 -.180 .169 -.206 .170 -.207 .170 
October-December -.380  .164 -.308 .171 -.283 .172 -.284 .172 
      
Type of education:      
General   ref.  ref.  ref. 
Aesthetic, classical    -.188 .451 -.156 .456 -.157 .456 
Pedagogic   .172  .399 .256  .401 .256  .401 
Administration, trade    -.078 .290 -.065 .290 -.062 .291 
Industrial, handicraft    -.127 .290 -.116 .291 -.115 .291 
Transport, communication    .377 .436 .455  .439 .454  .439 
Social and health care    .198 .309 .233  .311 .233  .311 
Agriculture, woods, fishing    -.231 .644 -.245 .649 -.245 .649 
Service, civil guard, military    .319 .366 .307  .367 .307  .367 
Missing, non-assignable    .377 .381 .455  .390 .455  .390 
      
Baseline:      
1-14 days  -3.25 .309 -2.55 .504 -2.65 .516 -2.65 .518 
14-28 days  -4.81 .354 -4.07 .538 -4.17 .549 -4.17 .549 
28-56 days  -5.42 .381 -4.64 .562 -4.75 .573 -4.75 .573 
56-715 days  -6.75 .365 -5.90 .543 -6.01 .561 -6.01 .562 
No.  of  observations  575 575 575 575 
* City counties are Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö (LAN=1, 12, 14). Forest counties are 
Värmland, Kopparberg, Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Jämtland, Västerbotten. and Norrland 
(LAN=17, 20-25). 
 